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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this article is to identify and compare the impact of human capital investment, 
gender and labour market characteristics on income inequality in the different categories of young 
employed people in four Arab countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon). We are supported by 
the results of the SAHWA Youth Survey 2015. The main results show a significant impact of human 
capital investment on incomes in the countries studied. It is greatest in Lebanon and Tunisia. 
Additionally, when levels of human capital are equal, young Lebanese are the best paid. Educational 
inequalities linked to social origin have a confirmed effect on the investment in education, above all in 
Egypt and Lebanon. What is more, the effects of gender inequalities are clearly evident despite women 
investing more than men in human capital: with equivalent levels of education and experience 
women’s income is 54% lower on average than men’s. This differential is still more pronounced in 
Algeria and Egypt. For Algeria, though the impact of social origin on education inequalities is modest 
compared to the other countries, the study shows that it is at the lower end of the scale when it comes 
to the return on human capital and income equality between men and women. The difficulty of 
incorporating the best educated into the labour market, the social management of employment and the 
absence of a clear wage policy in the private sector may explain these income inequalities. 
 
 
Keywords: income inequalities, human capital, gender, social origin, labour market, young people, 
Algeria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt. 
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EDUCATION, GENDER AND INCOME INEQUALITIES 
(Comparative study between Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon) 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Fighting social inequalities is the primary goal of all social change. Indeed, the 
demonstrations and demands for sociopolitical change in Arab countries were the result not 
only of difficulties finding work and housing, but were motivated, above all, by the sense that 
the economic, political and social systems are unjust (Stiglitz, 2012). These inequalities take 
different forms and the economic dimension strongly feeds the feelings of social injustice. 
Of these economic inequalities, those relating to income in Arab countries are 
seldom addressed by socioeconomic research on the region or by international institutions. As 
the last Global Wage Report published by the International Labour Organization in 2015 
explains, this makes the comparison of wage trends difficult (ILO, 2015). 
To this end, the SAHWA Survey, on which this paper is based, provides us with a 
new opportunity to glimpse the economic impact of education on young people and to discern 
the income inequalities that are linked to other factors such as the education system, the social 
differences between men and women, and the nature of the labour market. 
Indeed, several mechanisms that go beyond the economic domain come into play, 
notably, the inequalities in investment in human capital. The work on Arab countries confirms 
the relative impact of education level on income in employment (Benhayoun and Benzen, 
1995; Destré and Nordman, 2002; El Hamidi, 2005; Ben Halima, Kocoglu and Ben Halima, 
2010; Lassassi and Muller, 2014; Dhaoui, 2015). 
Inequalities linked to gender also provide some explanation of the income 
inequalities; our focus, after all, is Arab countries – patriarchal regimes par excellence in 
which the division of social roles between men and women is very marked. Indeed, eighteen 
countries in the MENA region impose restrictions on the type of jobs women can hold, a 
situation that leads to large wage gaps by comparison to men (ILO, 2015). Lassassi and 
Muller (2014) have also shown that women are paid less than men in the different segments  
of the Algerian labour market. 
Other characteristics associated with the structure of the labour market (such as the 
legal sector and regional specificity) also impact the return on education and experience, 
which are greater in the public sector in Tunisia and in Algeria (M. Ben Halima et al., 2010; 
Lassassi and Muller, 2014). The wage gaps between the private and public sectors explain the 
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low appeal of the private sector in Tunisia (Ben Halima et al., 2010). In the cases of Egypt  
and Morocco at the end of the 1990s, El Hamidi (2005) showed towards that qualifications 
were not reflected in productivity differences but were well remunerated in the public sector. 
Hence, human capital in the MENA countries has less effect on economic growth (Pissarides 
and Varoudakis, 2005 in Ben Halima et al., 2010). 
In terms of geographical area, Benhayoun and Benzen (1995) confirmed a positive 
relationship between investment in human capital and wages in a sample of men, with 
significant differences found between the Rabat Kenitra and Casablanca areas. 
In this paper, the focus is on economic differences: income inequality among the 
different categories of young employed people in the labour market in four Arab countries 
(Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon). The article is structured as follows: first we will 
present a brief review of the literature on the theory of human capital, as the main theory 
addressing income inequalities in the labour market and, specifically, the Mincer earnings 
function; based on the criticisms and limitations of this model in relation to social origin, 
gender and the heterogeneity of the labour market, we will attempt to improve our basic 
econometric model; then we will set out the methodology and results of the model. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The analysis of income inequalities primarily rests on the theory of human capital. 
This theory has undergone several evolutions, with more extensive explanations being added 
to it principally from the sociology of education, gender studies and the theory of the 
heterogeneity of the labour market. In what follows, we will go on to set out a brief synthesis 
of each theory. 
 
1. Human capital and critical theories 
The theory of human capital shaped by Gary Becker provides an original interpretation of 
wage gaps between individuals. It rests on the concept of the homo economicus. This rational 
individual seeks to maximise their profits by investing in their human capital, which is the set 
of productive capacities an individual acquires through the accumulation of general and 
specific knowledge, know-how and so on (G. Becker, 1964). Hence, the central hypothesis of 
this theory considers education (of individuals and society) to be an investment that favours 
increased productivity. This determines, by consequence, the distribution of individual 
earnings and economic growth. Denison (1962) and Shultz (1963) found that the education of 
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the workforce contributes in a significant way to the economic growth of the United States 
(Denison, 1962; Shultz, 1963; in Logossah, 2004). 
Thus, Mincer shows that as well as reducing the risks of unemployment, high levels of 
education ensure higher salaries (Mincer, 1974). According to Mincer, there are two 
complementary forms of human capital: educational investments on the one hand and 
investments in the form of professional experience on the other. Though this has given clear 
credit to the hypothesis put forward by the theorists of human capital (Jarousse and Mingat, 
1986), it has been widely criticised because of the complexity of the education variable and 
the number of other factors that come into play, taking it away from the perfect competition 
situation in which the theory places itself. 
 
1.1 The education system and income inequality 
The education system’s complexity is due to the involvement of several variables that 
play an indisputable role in configuring the distribution of individual schooling. From this 
point of view, where the education variable is used in the theory of human capital, specifically 
in the Mincer earnings function, it does not allow the system’s influence to be felt in all its 
complexity, such as the impact of family environment or social origin on income. This is one 
of the most significant criticisms made of this theory (Riboud, 1978; Kiker and Heath, 1985; 
Boumahdi and Plassard, 1992). 
For its part, the sociological and economic literature has tended to provide 
explanations. Bourdieu and Passeron showed in the foundational work of educational 
sociology, Héritiers, that the democratisation of education, instead of reducing educational 
inequalities among the various social classes, has led to the opposite: to the reproduction of 
the social structure of the dominant class. According to these two authors, the educational 
success of this social class (children of executives) is not explained by their talent but by their 
cultural heritage (mastery of the language, method of reasoning, common knowledge, etc.). 
Democratic schooling enhances this through teaching methods and content (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1968). 
Staying within the Marxist tradition, like Bourdieu, Bowles and Gintis are influenced 
by this school of thought (1975; 1976). They have also advanced the idea that the school is in 
the service of the capitalist system and serves to perpetuate the domination of its ruling class. 
Compulsory education that is limited to working class children only instils the attitudes 
necessary for manual labour, while the higher education reached mainly by the children of the 
middle and upper classes (those of the proletariat being eliminated) tends to confer the 
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attitudes needed to take on management and innovation tasks (cf. Bowles and Gintis, 1975; 
1976; in Logossah, 2004). 
In contrast to Bourdieu and Passeron, Boudon finds that families’ individual strategies 
according to their social origin are more important in the determination of education 
inequalities than the functioning of the school: the costs and benefits of education investment 
are estimated differently according to social origin. Rich families underestimate the cost of 
their children's education and overvalue qualifications, while families with modest origins 
overestimate costs and undervalue qualifications (Boudon, 1973). These different strategies 
have repercussions for social success, notably in terms of remuneration in the labour market. 
Boudon's results have been revisited by several researchers such as Goux and Maurin (1995), 
and Durut-Bellat (2002). For Ballion (1982), this is the consumerist behaviour of well-off 
families who benefit from the room for manoeuvre offered by the school system in order to 
facilitate the educational success of their children in private education; we may also add the 
use of private tutoring particularly in the case of Algeria. 
Likewise, by studying the influence of social factors such as family environment 
(parents’ level of education, profession, income) on the demand for education, Anderson 
confirmed a marked effect of social origin on access to secondary and higher education 
(Anderson, 1983; in Logossah, 2004). 
 
1.2 Gender income inequalities 
Sociological and economic studies have shed some light on the salary gap that exists 
between men and women in the labour market. The theory of domination justifies this gap 
between different demographic groups (sex, race, etc.) as an effect of the domination 
exercised by the categories that hold most power in society (Reich, 1981; in Logossah, 2004). 
Similarly, patriarchal beliefs have an effect which is used to explain this sexual segregation 
through male dominance, which takes its power from the financial authority of the man as 
head of household (Cova, 2009). This leads employers, generally men, to keep the best-paid 
jobs for themselves (Hartmann, 1978). 
For its part, the economics of discrimination begun by F. Edgeworth (1922) specifies 
that income differences between races or sexes are the result of discrimination exercised 
according to the preferences of economic actors (employers, salaried men and consumers) 
(Becker, 1957). Additionally, the prejudices and expectations of employers uncertain about 
the productivity of individuals may result in lower incomes and less well paid jobs for women 
and minorities (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). 
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In the same line, Joshi (1989) brings new precision to the issue of salary 
discrimination according to sex. This reveals two types of discrimination, which are, in fact, 
linked to one another. The first concerns women who work part time (numerous in Great 
Britain), the second is associated with the consequences of maternity and the conditions of 
being the mother of a family (Joshi, 1989 in: Yves Chassard, 1990). Following Becker on the 
theory of the family (1991) and the sexual division of work (1985), women take care of 
domestic and family tasks because their income prospects in the labour market are inferior to 
men’s. This division maximises family well-being (Meurs, Paithé and Ponthieu, 2010). 
In the same context, fertility and the interruption of women's economic activity is the 
source of the income divisions between the sexes. Three effects are pointed out by Meurs, 
Paithé and Ponthieu (2010). The first is visible in the participation of women in the labour 
market, with maternity leave the main factor interrupting the professional cycle. The second 
effect concerns part-time work as a way of reconciling family and professional life, which is 
associated with lower-paid jobs, as shown by Merouani and Nicole in Au labeur des dames, 
métier masculin et emploi féminin (1989), paraphrasing the title of Emile Zola’s Au Bonheur 
des femmes. Finally, the third effect that holds women back is the suspicion that they are first 
of all mothers or future mothers who may leave work temporarily or permanently. 
Additionally, education inequalities between girls and boys may be the basis of these 
inequalities in the labour market, particularly when it comes to salaries. The sociological 
works of Donain (1985), Duru-Bellat and Mingat (1993) “show that teachers do not 
encourage the same aptitudes among girls and boys. They favour the spirit of competition 
among boys and the respect for rules among girls. The culture of competition instilled in boys 
leads them to overestimate their capacities, an important factor in their orientation and then on 
their choice of better paid jobs, while the girls, by contrast, hesitate to seek the scientific 
fields”. 
 
1.3. The heterogeneity of the labour market and income inequalities 
The theory of human capital that has served as the basis for explaining income 
inequalities has undergone major evolution, while maintaining the main hypothesis relating to 
the positive relationship between human capital and productivity. Theories on the 
heterogeneity of the labour market have contributed to this evolution: these are based on the 
existence of several different markets such as the formal and the informal. The first 
determines its remuneration by following administratively constructed matrices, while the 
second obeys the law of supply and demand. In other words, this theory places itself on the 
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side of demand, in which the variability of incomes is determined by the market and does not 
depend on the worker's productivity (Logossah, 1994). 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
In order to analyse the income inequalities in four Arab Mediterranean countries (Algeria, 
Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon), this paper uses the data from the original SAHWA Survey. At 
least in Algeria, this is the first survey conceived especially for young people (15–29 year 
olds). The survey’s originality lies, first of all, in the advantage it provides for the comparative 
study of the four countries. Second, the survey provides a set of variables rich enough to  
touch upon all the domains that concern young people and allows the more overlooked paths 
to be explored. 
Thus, to analyse of the effect of human capital on income inequalities in the labour 
market, the SAHWA database (2015) informs us about a sample of 2508 employed people, of 
whom 1839 are salaried and 669 employers, the self-employed and caregivers. Among these 
employed people, only 307 have taken professional training, most at a middle or secondary 
level. 
In terms of the phenomenon we wish to study, the SAHWA Survey gives us the 
opportunity to observe the distribution of net earnings in the month prior to the reference 
month1 in local money. This information is not always available for several of the countries. 
For the purposes of the comparability of monetary, these net earning have been converted into 
a common unit, in this case purchasing power parity in dollars ($PPP)2. A first descriptive 
overview reveals two important results (Figure 1). First, it turns out that young Lebanese 
people are paid, on average, one and half times (1.5) more than Algerians, two and a half 
times as much (2.6) as Tunisians and more than three times (3.3) as much as Egyptians. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The SAHWA Survey reference months are January 2016 for Egypt and November 2015 for the other countries. 
2 The GDP deflators of the World Bank were used for calculation. 
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Figure 1 
 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
 
 
Furthermore, the gap between male and female pay is much wider in Lebanon and 
Egypt at 15% than in Algeria and Tunisia with 10% and 7.9%, respectively. Looking at the 
professional situation, we note that in general the salaried are less well paid than the 
unsalaried. This difference is clearly evident in Lebanon (+ 1.7 points). In Egypt, by contrast, 
the trend is the opposite. Note that the two categories of salaried workers, full-time and part- 
time,are grouped together. 
All in all, we can clearly see that incomes vary from one region to another according 
to different criteria. If we take the effect of human capital as the principal determinant, we can 
see that its provision in each country is different. But other observable and unobservable 
characteristics come into play, affecting the incomes directly or indirectly. 
For the needs of our analysis, the key information on young students’ level of 
education is indispensable. From this survey we have an approximation of the duration of 
studies thanks to the “year of finishing studies” variable from which we calculate the age at 
the end of studying.3 This variable is slightly biased, being data from which we cannot extract 
repeated years or studying being stopped for one reason or another. However, the number of 
years of study is considered a good proxy for measuring education (Green, 2011). The graph 
below (figure 2) informs us of the average duration of studies in each country. This is around 
11.5 years of study, except for Lebanon where it reaches 13 years. The clear difference 
between girls (13.5 years study on average) and boys (11.4) in the four countries must be 
emphasised. This difference is less accentuated in Egypt (Annexe, Table 6). 
 
 
 
3 The first six (06) years are of course not counted, with the assumption being that in the four (04) countries 
official schooling begins at the age of 6. 
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Figure 2 
 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
From another angle, thanks to the variable "age at first employment", with each 
professional category mixed up, we can approximately calculate the length of each 
individual’s professional experience. The length of a possible period of unemployment 
between one job and another is not taken into account. As a result, the duration of studies and 
professional experience will possibly be overestimated. 
However, unlike for entrepreneurs (self-employed, business creators), for the salaried 
we only have information on the legal and economic sectors of their companies. And yet the 
size of the company, its location and competitive position in the labour market are supposedly 
significant elements in the determination of the income obtained. Jointly with the levels of 
education and professional experience, these factors explain 25% of the wage gap between 
workers, while the phenomenon of discrimination accounts for 10% of that gap (Blau and 
Feber, 1992; Altonji and Blank, 1999). This study will, unfortunately, be forced to omit this 
aspect despite its importance. By contrast, the scale of job precariousness can be examined by 
assessing the formal or informal nature of the jobs held based on social security registration. 
The survey gives us access both to a set of information on the living conditions of the 
young people surveyed, the region they live in and the personal characteristics of their 
parents. The next section presents the results of the estimates of the return on education and 
professional experience in the income of each employed young person, and discusses the 
effect of other factors liable to influence the initial model along with the base hypotheses. 
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3. Empirical framework 
Mincer's theory (1974), tested time and again by the theorists of human capital and the 
labour market, still remains the inevitable basis of all initial exploratory work addressing the 
functioning of supply in the labour market. Despite its demonstrated limitations (Logossah, 
2004; Mingat, 1986; and others), it all the same establishes the principal hypotheses on which 
occupational choice is based in the labour market: the formation of human capital, both 
educational and professional, is the key determinant of employment and remuneration. For 
Mincer, human capital is the capitalisation of a certain level of skills accumulated through 
education and professional training and experience in the labour market. 
 
Basic Mincer function 
First, taking the basic Mincer function as a first illustration, it is interesting to note the 
gross effect of human capital on income variability perceived following an occupational 
choice. In other words, in a perfect competition model. Indeed, it is assumed that the 
individual makes rational decisions. They must manage their capital (increase their  
investment in education or training) in order to maximise their income, assuming that there is 
a linear relationship between income and human capital potential. Wage gaps merely reflect 
different skills levels. The socioeconomic hazards of the labour market and the characteristics 
of the company are, thus, not taken into account. This theory proclaims the marginal 
productivity of the employee to be the sole determinant of the salary. Thus, all individuals 
with the same level of skill should have equal chances of recruitment. 
Hence, Mincer's standard equation (1974) appears as follows: 
 
 
Coefficients b and c represent the return on education and experience, respectively. 
The square of experience is introduced to examine the linearity of the latter, which is possibly 
concave. represents the estimation error due to unobservable factors that should fall within 
the explanation of the model.  is a constant that represents the base or reserve salary, without 
taking the human capital into account. 
With a simple log-linear regression of income, it is clear that the two variables have 
some effect on the variability of income, according to the estimate below. Nevertheless, they 
only explain a minimal part of the income logarithm variability, namely 6.7% (R2=0.067; see 
Annexe, Table 7). 
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Ln Income i= 5.598 + 0.057* Study_length i + 0.066* Experience i -0.004* Experience2i + . 
(69.76)  (11.44) (4.96) (-4.485) 
 
( ) Student statistic (see Annexe, Table 6). 
 
 
Improved Mincer model 
However, do two individuals starting out with the same observed level of qualification 
really find themselves in similar positions in the labour market? 
The simplified Mincer equation cannot answer this question. The hypothesis of perfect 
competition is not verified. Hence, more objectivity should be brought to the model of the 
labour market operation, bringing in other fundamental factors such as individual 
characteristics and working conditions. 
Ln Incomei = a + b* Duration of studiesi + c *Experiencei + d * Experiencei2 + d * Xi + εi 
 
Xi represents these additional aspects that will complete the initial Mincer equation. The first 
aspect, so disputed in theory, is the gender difference we explained above. It is essential to 
know the impact of gender on the earnings functions we have just been estimating. We must 
also take into account the spatial dimension, notably between the urban and the rural. We will 
add the acquisition of professional training and finally, to in some way define the 
characteristics of the labour market and its effects on income, we will introduce the 
professional situation of the young person (salaried/unsalaried), the legal sector and sector of 
economic activity of the post held and social security registration. 
 
Table1: Definition of variables 
 
Variable Name used in the model Characteristics/ Values Modalities 
Duration of studies Study_duration Number of years 
Professional experience PEX Number of years 
Professional experience squared PEX2 Number of years squared 
Sex sex Man: 1 
Woman: 0 
Professional PT Yes: 1 
No: 0 
Salaried SALR Salaried: 1 
Unsalaried: 0 
Legal sector LS Public: 1 
Private: 0 
Sector of economic activity SAA 
SAI 
AB 
Agriculture 
Industry 
BTPH 
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 SAH 
SAED 
SAC 
SAOM 
SAAN 
Health 
Education 
Commerce 
Other market services 
Administration, non-market services 
Social security SS Registered: 1 
Unregistered: 0 
Algeria DZ Yes: 1 
No: 0 
Egypt EG Yes: 1 
No: 0 
Lebanon LB Yes: 1 
No: 0 
Tunisia TN Yes: 1 
No: 0 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
Before assessing this model, we must be sure of the hypothesis of exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables introduced required by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, which 
is the method that is classically used to estimate earnings functions. With the data, cross- 
sectional in our case, this hypothesis is often unverified and the estimators give biased effects 
(Balsan, Hanchane and Werquin, 1996). This bias is due to a measurement error of the 
endogenous variable. Technically, part of explanation of the endogenous variable at the same 
time explains the dependent variable. In this case, the standard OLS estimator is non- 
convergent as a result of the presence of errors in the measurement of the explanatory 
variables (Racicot, 1993). 
What is more, the estimation by OLS underestimates the return of education and 
experience on salaries (Boumahdi and Plassard, 1992). This underestimation stems from the 
fact that young people have unobserved assets or characteristics that would also explain the 
income variability. 
 
Impact of social origin on investment in human capital 
In the literature, the supposedly endogenous variable in the earnings equation is, 
unanimously, education. It is, in fact, the result of optimal decisions (Griliches, 1977). Indeed, 
several factors relating to social origin such as social status of parents or size of household in 
one way or another influence children's level of education. The use of the Hausman test 
(1978) confirms this hypothesis. This test, which consists of comparing the estimators of the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method and the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method shows 
the correlation between the error that results from the regression of the education variable and 
the error in the model of earnings estimation as a whole (see Inset 1). What is more, the 
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results reveal that there is certainly a difference between the coefficients of the two methods 
that validates the endogeneity hypothesis of the education variable (see Table 3). 
 
 
Hence, to mitigate the effect of the endogeneity of the variable of young people's 
education we introduce the parents’ human capital into a second equation as a corrector, 
which we call an instrumental variable, supposing that it affects the level of the young 
person's education and not the level of their earnings. 
Duration of studies = function (level of father's education, level of mother's education, Zi). 
By Z we designate all the explanatory variables we have introduced into the model. 
Zi= (Study_length, experience, Xi). 
The income equation thus becomes: , where  represents 
the new error potential of the estimation, that is, once the Xi factors are taken into account.. 
Which means applying a two-stage least square. 
It should be noted that, in the case of parents, the SAHWA database does not provide 
us with the duration of studies, but only the level of education by educational level. In 
consequence, we will introduce each level as a dichotomous variable, inserting as a reference 
the level “without education”. 
 
Table 2: Definition of the variables of the parents' level of education 
 
Education level of 
father: 
Primary LeF_Prim Yes: 1; No: 0 
Middle LeF_Mid Yes: 1; No: 0 
Secondary LeF_Sec Yes: 1; No: 0 
Higher LeF_High Yes: 1; No: 0 
distribution of chi-square to k degrees of freedom, relative to the number of endogenous 
variables (Crépon, 2005). 
In our case, since the respective standard deviations are: , H= 
32.77. As the critical value at the 95% significance level of the chi-square distribution to one 
degree of freedom is equal to 3.84, the null hypothesis is therefore rejected. In other words, 
the OLS estimator does not converge. 
represents the and is the variation 
represent, respectively, the 2SLS and OLS estimators of the Where 
endogenous variable. 
, 
Inset 1: the Hausman test 
 
Under the null hypothesis that 
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Education level of 
mother: 
Primary LeM_Prim Yes: 1; No: 0 
Middle LeM_Mid Yes: 1; No: 0 
Secondary LeM_Sec Yes: 1; No: 0 
Higher LeM_High Yes: 1; No: 0 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
Table 3 provides the results with OLS and 2SLS. The first piece of striking 
information that emerges from this table is the confirmation of an underestimation of the 
return on most of the explanatory factors, notably education. Indeed, for each additional year 
of study, the young person will have average earnings of over 3.7% more with the estimation 
using OLS and 14% more with 2SLS. That is more than ten points. This finding shows us the 
importance of the social origin of a young person in the evolution of their studies which is 
subsequently reflected in income; we will develop this point further later on, in the results. 
The regression of the education variable (first stage of the 2SLS method) shows us that the 
higher the level of parents' education, the more the length of children's studies increases. This 
applies more for the father than for the mother (see Annexe, Table 2). 
However, it should be underlined that the use of instrumental variables also has its 
limitations. It reduces the precision of the model and necessitates a larger sample size (R2= 
37% robustness compared to 42%). 
 
Table 3: Estimation of the equation of earnings, comparison between OLS and 2SLS 
 
 
OLS 2SLS 
B t Sig. B t Sig. 
(Constant) 5.900 73.264 0.000 4.662 20.060 .000 
Duration of studies 
.036 8.512 .000 .132 7.633 .000 
Experience 
.030 2.767 .006 .047 3.777 .000 
Experience squared 
-.001 -1.268 .205 .000 -.484 .629 
Sex 
.328 9.290 .000 .432 9.981 .000 
SS 
.408 12.114 .000 .198 3.797 .000 
Region of residence 
-.099 -3.031 .002 -.015 -.387 .699 
Salaried 
-.226 -6.259 .000 -.238 -5.883 .000 
Egypt 
-.709 -15.865 .000 -.804 -15.319 .000 
Lebanon 
.394 9.393 .000 .298 5.993 .000 
Tunisia 
-.479 -10.676 .000 -.512 -10.156 .000 
R2 0.42 0.37 
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F 155.270 124.880 
a. Dependent variable: log income last month in $PPP 
b. Algeria: reference. 
 
 
Earnings equation factors in each country 
In the first stage, we applied our earnings equation to the whole sample of the 
employed people and to each country separately (Table 4). 
We note that professional training and sector of economic activity did not have significant 
effects in this model, which led us to exclude them (see Annexe, Table 1). 
 
Table 4: OLS equation estimations for income 
 
 Model 1 AMC Model 2 DZ Model 3 EG Model 4 LB Model 5 TN 
 B % B % B % B % B % 
(Constant) 4,662*** 
(0.232) 
 
5,377*** 
(0.388) 
 
4,611*** 
(0.388) 
 
4,357*** 
(0.388) 
 
3,436*** 
(0.583) 
 
Study_duration ,132*** 
(0.017) 
13.2 ,079* 
(0.030) 
7,9 ,065** 
(0.030) 
6,5 ,181*** 
(0.026) 
18,1 ,172*** 
(0.043) 
17,2 
PEX ,047*** 
(0.012) 
4.7 NS NS NS NS ,053** 
(0.024) 
5,3 ,054* 
(0.032) 
5,4 
PEX2 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Sex ,432*** 
(0.043) 
54 ,548*** 
(0.100) 
73 ,412*** 
(0.100) 
51 ,444*** 
(0.069) 
56 ,374*** 
(0.102) 
45 
SS ,198*** 
(3,052) 
22 ,369*** 
(0.104) 
45 ,253*** 
(0.104) 
29 NS NS ,383*** 
(0.108) 
47 
Rég NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
SALR -,238*** 
(0.040) 
-21 -,287*** 
(0.092) 
-25 -,010 
(0.092) 
 
-,395*** 
(0.065) 
-33 -,065 
(0.102) 
NS 
EG -,804*** 
(0.052) 
-55 
        
LB ,298*** 
(0.050) 
35 
        
TN -,512*** 
(0.050) 
-40 
        
R2 0,368 36.8 0,184 18.4 0,082 8.2 0,219 21.9 0,155 15.5 
NB: - The percentages (%) represent the return of each variable on the log of income. The calculation method is the 
following: 100(EXP (B)-1) for dummy variables; B is the coefficient obtained in the estimation. 
- The figures in parentheses represent the standard deviations. 
- The degree of significance of the coefficients are represented by: *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
 
 
The robustness of the estimate presents a valid overall model of close to 37%. 
Distribution by country gives estimates that are not very robust, notably for Egypt (the model 
only explains 8% of the income gap). That is due on the one hand to the weakness of the 
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observed sample, but also to the particularities of the economic and social context of each 
country, which would likely produce individual explanatory factors for each. 
 
Earnings equation factors by gender and situation in the labour market 
We now look at our estimate of the samples divided by category – salaried/non- 
salaried, private/public and woman/man – to better capture the relative effect of each variable 
(Table 5). 
 
Table 5: OLS equation estimations for income 
 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Unsalaried % Salaried % Private % Public % Female % Male % 
(Constante) 3,404*** (0.595)  
4,865*** 
(0.223) 
 
4,499*** 
(0.243) 
 
4,331*** 
(0.561) 
 
3,796*** 
(0.437) 
 
5,604*** 
(0.241) 
 
Study_ 
duration 
,189*** 
(0.038) 
18,9 ,102*** 
(0.016) 
10,2 ,130*** 
(0.017) 
13 ,128*** 
(0.038)) 
12,8 ,156*** 
(0.034) 
15,6 ,107*** 
(0.018) 
10,7 
Sex ,632*** (0.113) 
88 ,318*** 
(0.045) 
37 ,442*** 
(0.047) 
56 ,409*** 
(0.110) 
51 
_ _ _ _ 
SS ,235** (0.112) 
27 ,257*** 
(0.054) 
29 ,180*** 
(0.056) 
20 ,220* 
(0.121) 
25 ,174* 
(0.103) 
19 ,236*** 
(0.057) 
27 
PEX ,096*** (0.036) 
9,6 ,031*** 
(0.012) 
3,1 ,058*** 
(0.013) 
5.8 NS  ,056** (0.026) 
5,6 ,033** 
(0.014) 
3,3 
PEX2 NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  
SALR _ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
NS 
 
-,309*** 
(0.044) 
-27 
FP 
 
NS 
 
 
NS 
 
 
NS 
 
 
NS 
 
,181** 
(0.089) 
20  NS 
 
EG -1,129*** (0.154) 
-68 -,747*** 
(0.051) 
-53 -,877*** 
(0.060) 
-58 -,775*** 
(0.115) 
-54 -,704*** 
(0.124) 
-51 -,808*** 
(0.060) 
-55 
LB ,330** (0.130) 
39 ,250*** 
(0.051) 
28 ,300*** 
(0.059) 
35 ,326*** 
(0.121) 
39 ,297*** 
(0.095) 
35 ,300*** 
(0.059) 
35 
TN -,720*** (0.135) 
-51 -,459*** 
(0.050) 
-37 -,562*** 
(0.057) 
-43 -,331*** 
(0.121) 
-28 -,354*** 
(0.096) 
-30 -,583*** 
(0.058) 
-44 
R2 ,354 35.4 ,396 39.6 ,381 38 ,292 29 ,371 37.1 ,394 39.4 
NB: - the percentages (%) represent the return of each variable on the log of income. The calculation method is the following: 
100(EXP (B)-1); B is the coefficient obtained in the estimate. 
- The figures in parentheses represent the standard deviations. 
- The degree of significance of the coefficients is represented by: *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
 
 
The breakdown by category, on the other hand, gives fairly convincing results. The 
variation of the factors chosen explains between 29% and 39% of the income variability, 
which is largely satisfactory with a sample of this size (2008 employed people). It is still 
necessary to go into the issue of advantage to find fuller explanations for this phenomenon. 
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Equally, the effect of selection that has not been addressed in this paper must not be 
forgotten. The fact of not taking into consideration that employed young people know that the 
unemployed are also looking for work, for whom the wage is probably their top decision 
criterion, effectively engenders a selection bias. Addressing this would certainly improve the 
quality of the earnings model presented. 
The next section will give a socioeconomic reading of the empirically obtained results. 
 
 
RESULTS 
Investment in human capital can explain nearly 29% of the variability in earnings in 
the four countries studied, more specifically, 14.5% for education and the same for 
professional experience. 
When it comes to the investment in education, we have shown above that social origin, 
especially parents’ level of education (among other factors), impacts considerably on the 
educational progress of children in a linearly positive manner (Figure 3). Three explanations 
for the effect of parents' education on children’s educational success can be put forward. High 
levels of parental education can guarantee good social status for children. Among other 
reasons, good material conditions allow them to remain in the education system for a long 
time. Indeed, 42.3% of fathers with higher level of studies are in senior management (see 
Annexe, Table 8). They can also monitor their children in their studies, acting positively on 
the children’s perception of the social value of education. 
Figure 3 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
 
 
On the other hand, the comparison between the four AMCs reveals that the impact of 
parents' education, notably that of the father, is greater in Egypt and in Lebanon than in 
Tunisia and Algeria. In relative terms, the modest effect of parents' education seen in Algeria 
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may be related to state policy in terms of social education services. This policy has effected a 
relative reduction of the education inequalities linked to social origin. Indeed, the free nature 
of primary to higher education along with the social support given to the disadvantaged 
(education allowance and free distribution of school materials and books) and the significant 
sums earmarked by the education ministry for social works (transport, catering, 
accommodation and scholarships for all unemployed students) has enabled greater access to 
school. 
On the other hand, although Algeria shows fewer inequalities connected to social 
origin, the return of education on earnings is lower than in Lebanon and Tunisia. Each 
additional year of study brings just 8% growth to earnings in Algeria, compared with 18.1% 
and 17.5% in Lebanon and Tunisia, respectively. This is the same for experience, which 
seems only to be significant in these two countries (5.3% and 5.4%, respectively; Table 4). It 
must, however, be recalled that we are dealing with employed young people, possibly holders 
of their first job. 
In terms of income inequalities linked to gender, the results in the four countries show 
that the return on education is relatively greater among women than men (close to 15.6% as 
opposed to 10.7% among men). The same result is shown for professional experience in terms 
of gender (5.6% for women and 3.3% for men; Table 5). This leads us to believe that women 
invest more in their human capital as an integration strategy for the purposes of establishing 
themselves in the labour market as the results in the four countries show. 
Furthermore, a notable effect also revealed by this study is the marked income gap 
between men and women, which surpasses 50% for the countries studied (Table 4). This 
appears to be greater in Algeria than in the other countries (73%). 
Analysing these income gaps in the four countries through education level and legal 
sector, we observe that gender discrimination is present, notably in the private  informal 
sector, regardless of education level. We note that just as with the boys, the majority of girls 
in most countries find themselves in the informal sector (67.4%; see Annexe, Table 4 and 
Figure 4). The earnings gap in this sector widens so that girls holding middle or secondary 
level education are paid two (02) times less than boys in the same kind of profession, which is 
mainly retail or handicrafts, where the pay is already low. In the formal private sector, where 
22% of the girls were employed, the gap was around half a point (0.5) on average between 
boys and girls, measured from the mean level. Egypt and Lebanon are special cases at the 
mean level, where the gap rises to over two points (02). But we are unable to comment on the 
case of Egypt, given that the group concerned is minimal. What is more, the public sector is 
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no exception to the rule. It also reveals salary discrimination towards women although, 
relatively, it is less significant. Since the state is meant to guarantee equality between men and 
women in the labour market, notably in Algeria and Tunisia, this finding probably stems from 
the difference between sectors of economic activity, as is confirmed otherwise by the theory 
of the heterogeneity of the labour market (see Annexe, Table 9 to 12). Nevertheless, in 
general, we can state that unsalaried men are 88% better paid than unsalaried women in these 
countries as a whole. 
Figure 4 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
 
 
On the other hand, the unsalaried have a 10% higher margin of income for each 
additional year of experience compared to the salaried, who have only a 3.6% increase. This 
result seems logical since the salaried have a stable income which only increases by an 
established proportion with a rise in grade or position. While the unsalaried theoretically find 
themselves in a competitive market, all additional experience allows them to take further 
steps, to explore other markets and thereby multiply their income. In developing countries 
such as the AMCs, competition is not significant in what is a virgin market. At present, with 
equal levels of experience and education, the salaried are always paid less than the unsalaried 
in these countries (21% less). This is much more the case for men and those in the public 
sector (Table 5). In Egypt, the gap is growing less because of all the legal statutes. 
Finally, a no less important finding emerges from this empirical analysis. Young 
Egyptians are paid 56% less than Algerians, and Tunisians 40% less, levels of human capital 
being equal. The Lebanese, by contrast, receive 33% more than the Algerians. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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The aim of this paper was to identify and compare the impact of the return of human 
capital on income distribution among young people aged 15–29 years old in four Arab 
Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon and Egypt). The first finding showed a 
considerable impact of human capital investment on earnings. This is greatest in Lebanon and 
Tunisia. 
The results confirm the sizeable effect of social origin on the investment in education, 
which raises questions, first and foremost about the education policies in each country – above 
all Egypt and Lebanon – aiming to reduce education inequalities. 
Inequalities linked to gender added to education inequalities reveal that in these 
countries women receive 54% less income than men with equal levels of studies and 
experience: this result is most marked in Algeria and Egypt. It should also be stressed that 
women's investment in human capital, which is greater than men's, represents a rational 
strategy for joining the labour market. 
For Algeria, though the impact of social origin on education inequalities is modest 
compared to the other countries, the study shows that it is at the lower end of the scale when it 
comes to the return on human capital and income equality between men and women. This 
poor performance of human capital is linked, first of all, to the difficulty of incorporating 
young people into the labour market, notably the best educated, due to the mismatch between 
supply and demand in university training and the changes in the structure of the labour 
market, which offers more jobs for the less well educated in the informal sector. The adoption 
of a passive policy which pays paltry salaries in the framework of aid to employment schemes 
also contributes. 
It should also be noted that even if the return on professional experience does not play 
a large part in explaining the variability of earnings given the age category studied, it is no 
less important to state that the private sector and even the informal sector require experience. 
Given that there are no bridges between school and the labour market, young first-time 
jobseekers still have difficulties finding work. 
In terms of gender inequalities, less well educated girls are the least well protected in 
the labour market and the most discriminated against in terms of pay. This comes as a result 
of the absence of a clear wage policy to protect women in the sector. These inequalities also 
persist for girls protected in social security terms, having achieved at least an average level, 
notably in the formal private sector. To conclude, a no less important finding emerges from 
this empirical analysis. Young Egyptians are paid 56% less than Algerians and Tunisians 40% 
less, levels of human capital being equal. The Lebanese, by contrast, receive 33% more than 
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the Algerians. The low earnings of young people in Egypt and Tunisia may be explained by 
the fragile socioeconomic situation since the revolutions. For Algeria, the current state of the 
labour market, characterised by precariousness and informality may explain that decline in 
terms of earnings. In terms of the Lebanese, who are the best paid, this result relates to the 
quality of young employed people's education, of whom 38% have a higher level of 
education, as we have underlined above. 
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ANNEXE 
 
Table 1: OLS 
Coefficientsa 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardised coefficients Standardised coefficients 
 
t 
 
Sig. B Standard deviation Beta 
1 (Constant) 5.826 .095  61.399 .000 
 Duration of studies .037 .004 .166 8.654 .000 
 Experience .029 .011 .132 2.672 .008 
 Experience squared -.001 .001 -.057 -1.157 .247 
 Sex .307 .037 .153 8.323 .000 
 SS .397 .035 .214 11.346 .000 
 Region of residence -.092 .033 -.050 -2.765 .006 
 Salaried -.228 .037 -.109 -6.149 .000 
 Industrial sector .148 .066 .057 2.245 .025 
 Building and public works .078 .066 .030 1.190 .234 
 Healthcare sector .136 .088 .033 1.553 .121 
 Education sector -.109 .084 -.031 -1.306 .192 
 Commercial sector .108 .063 .047 1.700 .089 
 Other market services .055 .062 .026 .881 .379 
 Administration, non-market services .147 .072 .051 2.045 .041 
 Egypt -.716 .045 -.350 -15.966 .000 
 Lebanon .404 .043 .206 9.501 .000 
 Tunisia -.485 .045 -.223 -10.724 .000 
a. Dependent variable: log income last month in $PPP 
b. Agriculture: Reference 
c. Algeria: Reference 
 
 
Table 2: Regression of the education variable 
Coefficientsa 
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. B Standard deviation Beta 
1 (Constant) 11.516 .314  36.651 .000 
Experience -.114 .052 -.118 -2.188 .029 
Experience squared -.006 .003 -.093 -1.747 .081 
Sex -1.006 .167 -.113 -6.012 .000 
SS 1.766 .161 .213 10.997 .000 
Education level of father: Primary .654 .217 .072 3.012 .003 
Education level of father: Middle .984 .248 .097 3.969 .000 
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Education level of father: Secondary 1.729 .268 .161 6.460 .000 
Education level of father: Higher 2.581 .352 .172 7.341 .000 
Education level of mother: Primary .024 .215 .003 .113 .910 
Education level of mother: Middle .550 .259 .050 2.122 .034 
Education level of mother: 
Secondary 
 
.939 
 
.277 
 
.083 
 
3.394 
 
.001 
Education level of mother: Higher 1.706 .423 .088 4.035 .000 
Region of residence -.371 .161 -.045 -2.311 .021 
Salaried .230 .170 .025 1.349 .178 
Egypt .611 .218 .067 2.805 .005 
Lebanon .281 .215 .032 1.305 .192 
Tunisia .238 .221 .025 1.075 .282 
a. Dependent variable: Duration of studies 
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of mean income by gender in $PPP in Algeria 
 
Income last month in $PPP Female Male 
Gender of respondent Mean N Mean N 
Formal 
public 
Middle 487.6588 3 893.6927 25 
Secondary 974.6270 10 1263.8710 24 
 Higher 1009.1219 37 1189.6776 16 
 Total 968.0155 50 1088.4680 67 
Formal 
private 
Middle 1236.0054 9 1158.8413 28 
Secondary 902.5903 6 1951.9506 26 
 Higher 885.8569 23 1424.1560 12 
 Total 968.5882 38 1489.7229 70 
Informal 
private 
Primary 493.0542 6 745.8700 32 
Middle 571.4433 25 844.8402 131 
 Secondary 429.4523 15 944.9079 50 
 Higher 936.7763 10 626.4477 17 
 Total 585.6928 56 837.8576 234 
 
 
Table 4: Distribution of young employed people by gender and legal sector 
 
Legal 
sector 
and SS 
Algeria Egypt Lebanon Tunisia Total 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Formal 
public 18.1% 32.5% 5.9% 24.1% 5.1% 5.3% 8.0% 9.9% 8.8% 15.6% 
Formal 
private 18.6% 23.3% 12.9% 12.0% 38.5% 43.3% 18.5% 28.5% 22.2% 30.3% 
Informal 
private 61.4% 41.7% 81.2% 63.9% 53.9% 47.5% 71.0% 57.6% 67.4% 51.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 5: Average length of studies by employed young people 
 
 
Country 
 
Mean 
 
N 
Standard 
deviation 
DZ Male 10.97 367 3.176 
 Female 13.35 146 3.989 
 Total 11.65 513 3.587 
EG Male 11.13 490 4.133 
 Female 12.36 97 3.659 
 Total 11.33 587 4.082 
LB Male 12.27 429 4.108 
 Female 14.26 232 3.728 
 Total 12.97 661 4.088 
TN Male 11.24 327 3.859 
 Female 13.12 164 3.912 
 Total 11.87 491 3.973 
Total Male 11.42 1613 3.903 
 Female 13.47 639 3.875 
 Total 12.00 2252 4.003 
 
 
Table 6: Standard Mincer function 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardised coefficients Standardised coefficients  
 
t 
 
 
Sig. B Standard deviation Beta 
1 (Constant) 5.598 .080  69.766 .000 
 Duration of studies .057 .005 .254 11.443 .000 
 experience .066 .013 .307 4.964 .000 
 Experience squared -.004 .001 -.276 -4.485 .000 
a. Dependent variable: log income last month in $PPP 
 
 
Table 7: Quality of standard Mincer model 
 
Recapitulation of the models 
 
 
Model 
 
 
R 
 
R2 
 
Adjusted R2 
Standard 
estimation error 
1 .263a .069 .068 .86578 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Experience squared, Duration of studies, 
experience 
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Table 9: Education level of fathers of young people surveyed 
% In Education level of 
father 
 
 Employment status of father 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
 
Employer 
Tradesman, 
self- 
employed 
and artisan 
 
Farmer 
Professio 
nal and 
Senior 
Executive 
 
Middle 
manag 
er 
 
 
Employ 
ee 
 
Skilled 
labour 
er 
Unskill 
ed 
laboure 
r 
 
 
Inacti 
ve 
Education 
level of 
father 
No education 4,2% 12,4% 18,6% 1,6% 1,7% 9,4% 10,4% 22,3% 19,5% 100,0 % 
 Primary 4,0% 18,4% 9,0% 3,8% 7,7% 10,0% 12,9% 24,8% 9,3% 100,0 % 
 Middle  7,6% 
 
18,5% 
 
6,8% 
 
4,0% 
 
20,2% 
 
16,9% 
 
9,1% 
 
10,6% 
 
6,3% 100,0 % 
 Secondary  8,8% 
 
21,0% 
 
1,5% 
 
8,7% 
 
33,2% 
 
11,1% 
 
5,5% 
 
5,1% 
 
5,0% 100,0 % 
 Higher  11,1% 
 
10,4% 
 
,6% 
 
42,3% 
 
24,5% 
 
4,7% 
 
2,1% 
 
,6% 
 
3,6% 100,0 % 
Total   6,6% 
 
16,9% 
 
8,0% 
 
8,5% 
 
16,3% 
 
11,0% 
 
8,9% 
 
14,6% 
 
9,2% 100,0 % 
 
 
Table N°9: Average length of studies, average experience, average age and average income by 
gender 
Gender of respondent Male Female Total 
Average Standard 
error of 
the mean 
N Average Standard 
error of 
the mean 
N Average Standard 
error of 
the mean 
N 
Duration of 
studies 
DZ 10,97 ,166 367 13,35 ,330 146 11,65 ,158 513 
EG 11,13 ,187 490 12,36 ,372 97 11,33 ,168 587 
LB 12,27 ,198 429 14,26 ,245 232 12,97 ,159 661 
TN 11,24 ,214 327 13,12 ,305 164 11,87 ,179 491 
Experience DZ 5,55 ,177 401 4,05 ,302 157 5,12 ,156 558 
EG 7,53 ,198 559 3,89 ,390 108 6,95 ,185 667 
LB 5,28 ,173 486 3,90 ,190 263 4,80 ,133 749 
TN 5,72 ,216 353 3,82 ,273 173 5,09 ,175 525 
Age DZ 24,37 ,181 402 24,94 ,258 163 24,53 ,149 565 
EG 23,69 ,151 559 24,04 ,344 108 23,75 ,138 667 
LB 24,58 ,170 486 25,37 ,207 263 24,85 ,133 749 
TN 23,50 ,198 353 24,38 ,240 173 23,79 ,156 525 
Income last 
month en 
$PPA 
DZ 1002,78 41,96 377 817,10 42,04 148 950,38 32,56 525 
EG 461,26 19,68 523 340,63 26,42 90 443,62 17,32 613 
LB 1627,03 73,34 468 1202,18 70,41 252 1478,34 54,16 720 
TN 593,30 24,72 339 506,36 27,34 160 565,41 19,01 499 
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Table N°10: Average duration of studies, average experience, average age and average 
income according to social security affiliation 
Affiliation to Social Security Not affiliated Affiliated 
Average Standard error of the mean N Average Standard error of the mean N 
Duration of studies DZ 10,21 ,178 283 13,42 ,229 231 
EG 10,71 ,191 450 13,37 ,295 137 
LB 11,56 ,219 345 14,50 ,198 316 
TN 11,25 ,206 337 13,23 ,326 154 
experience DZ 5,78 ,213 319 4,24 ,214 239 
EG 7,23 ,211 524 5,92 ,371 143 
LB 5,14 ,200 409 4,38 ,164 340 
TN 5,13 ,216 366 5,01 ,294 160 
age DZ 23,71 ,209 325 25,65 ,185 239 
EG 23,22 ,157 524 25,66 ,229 143 
LB 23,99 ,200 409 25,89 ,148 340 
TN 23,07 ,190 366 25,44 ,219 160 
Income last month en $PPA DZ 789,38 33,60 300 1 164,29 58,39 226 
EG 404,66 19,47 471 573,45 35,69 141 
LB 1 393,72 90,71 390 1 578,33 49,32 330 
TN 461,45 19,05 350 809,50 38,59 149 
 
Table N°11: Average length of studies, average experience, average age and average income 
by occupational status 
 
Salaried 
Unsalaried Salaried 
Average Standard error of the mean N Average Standard error of the mean N 
Duration of studies DZ 10,57 ,260 139 12,05 ,190 374 
EG 10,65 ,345 117 11,50 ,191 470 
LB 11,98 ,279 213 13,44 ,190 448 
TN 11,09 ,384 107 12,09 ,202 384 
Experience DZ 6,54 ,324 155 4,58 ,168 403 
EG 7,67 ,398 146 6,74 ,209 521 
LB 5,73 ,255 241 4,35 ,150 508 
TN 6,34 ,413 119 4,73 ,188 407 
Age DZ 24,67 ,290 161 24,48 ,174 403 
EG 23,19 ,317 146 23,90 ,153 521 
LB 25,02 ,237 241 24,77 ,160 508 
TN 23,81 ,327 119 23,78 ,177 407 
Income last month en $PPA DZ 1175,45 101,50 139 869,04 23,70 386 
EG 558,99 90,64 99 421,44 10,93 514 
LB 2077,78 153,40 228 1200,55 27,36 492 
TN 607,61 52,26 114 552,93 19,19 385 
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Table N°12: Average length of studies, average experience, average age and average income 
by legal status of employment 
Job in public or private sector Public Private 
Average Standard error of the mean N Average Standard error of the mean N 
Duration of studies DZ 13,67 ,304 133 10,93 ,171 379 
EG 13,64 ,405 55 11,09 ,178 532 
LB 14,17 ,479 59 12,85 ,168 602 
TN 14,96 ,447 59 11,46 ,186 431 
Experience DZ 3,76 ,268 137 5,58 ,182 421 
EG 5,26 ,529 59 7,11 ,195 608 
LB 5,36 ,382 61 4,75 ,140 688 
TN 3,69 ,343 61 5,27 ,191 463 
Age DZ 25,72 ,250 137 24,15 ,176 427 
EG 25,76 ,362 59 23,55 ,145 608 
LB 26,33 ,360 61 24,72 ,140 688 
TN 25,43 ,330 61 23,58 ,169 463 
Income last month en $PPA DZ 1012,12 42,34 128 930,65 40,90 396 
EG 547,65 45,00 58 432,78 18,49 555 
LB 1429,03 87,00 60 1482,82 58,56 660 
TN 866,81 64,24 56 528,11 19,11 442 
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